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Abstracts 
This study assessed the nature of fiscal cyclicality within the Anglophone West African 
countries as well as Guinea (all known as the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
countries). This study was conducted within the context of the achievement of fiscal 
cyclicality objectives over the period covered by the study, as a pointer to the future due 
to the proposed monetary integration of the West African sub region. The cyclical conduct 
of fiscal policy by member countries of a monetary union is a crucial determinant of the 
coherence of the monetary union and hence, the significance of understanding the cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy within these West African countries. In this study, the models 
of fiscal policy cyclical behaviour of these WAMZ countries were specified at the level and 
backward-looking in line with the contemporaneous fiscal rule model and lagged fiscal 
rule model; and were estimated using annual panel data of the relative fiscal and output 
variables of the WAMZ countries spanning generally over the 15-year period between 
2000 and 2014. The countries under assessment are commodity exporting countries and 
the commodity windfalls uniformly influence government expenditure patterns in these 
countries. This makes the panel data regression estimations employed in this study to be 
appropriate. Panel data random effects generalised least square (RE-GLS) regressions, 
random effects maximum likelihood estimation (RE-MLE) regressions, generalised 
estimating equation (GEE) population-averaged regressions and fixed effects regressions 
were performed to generate results. The statistically significant results of the estimations 
of the contemporaneous fiscal rule estimations suggested counter-cyclicality across the 
four methods of regression. However, the lagged fiscal rule regression estimates 
generated statistically insignificant information about co-movements of fiscal policy and 
real output cycle variables, although counter-cyclicality was equally established. The 
indication of this is that fiscal policies move against business cycles in the Anglophone 
countries and Guinea, implying that in ‘bust’ or financial and economic crisis, fiscal 
authorities in these countries are likely to opt for expansionary fiscal policies (lowering 
revenue/taxes and raising expenditures) while they are likely to contract fiscal policy during ‘boom’. If on the take-off of monetary integration in West Africa, fiscal policy 
matters are eventually relinquished to national authorities, these would have 
implications for fiscal policy/monetary policy interactions within the proposed West 
African monetary union, when monetary policy would be in the hand of a supranational 
regional monetary authority while the fiscal policies would be in the hands of fifteen 
national authorities.  
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal cyclicality study deals with the movements of fiscal variables alongside output 
cycle; and the direction towards which revenues and expenditures move with output 
cycle. As a pointer to the future and within the context of the achievement of fiscal 
cyclicality objectives, this research study aimed at revealing the nature of fiscal cyclicality 
within the Anglophone West African countries as well as Guinea (all known as the West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) countries) over the period covered by the study. The 
cyclical conduct of fiscal policy by member countries of a monetary union is a crucial 
determinant of the coherence of the monetary union. Fiscal policy could be counter-
cyclical or pro-cyclical. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy enhances macroeconomic stability 
while pro-cyclicality causes further cross-country macroeconomic differences. These 
underpin the significance of the understanding the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy 
within and in the context of the West African countries being examined, given the 
proposed monetary integration of the West African sub region. 
2.  Theory and Concept of Fiscal Policy Cyclicality  
The investigations of consistency of the actual behaviour of fiscal authorities with the 
cyclical stabilisation of fiscal policy objectives have, in the last few decades, come to the 
fore. For existing and proposed monetary unions, this is an area of research interest since 
fiscal policy will always serve as a tool of macroeconomic stabilisation when dealing with the country specific shocks emanating from the union’s member state. When countries 
join a monetary union, it is automatic they will lose monetary policy tools that were 
hitherto available for fighting against shocks. If the countries within such monetary union 
are displaying some structural dissimilarities, this could make the loss of monetary policy 
instruments to be much more significant as these countries would be susceptible to 
asymmetric shocks. Therefore, national fiscal policy should be able to cushion the 
idiosyncratic shocks that might result due to the loss of national monetary policy. 
Within the perspective of economic crisis and in the context of the Eurozone and the 
financial crisis (which serves as lesson for proposed currency unions like the WAMZ), 
Benetrix and Lane (2012) identify three reasons on the importance of clear 
understanding of the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: (i)in consideration of the 
divergent macroeconomic outcomes in the Eurozone, which is an important factor in the 
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Eurozone crisis, there is need to understand the role of national fiscal policies; (ii) it is 
possible for the capacity of Eurozone countries to have been limited or constrained by 
insufficient fiscal counter cyclicality in the pre-crisis period; (iii) to have an 
understanding of fiscal performance during the pre-crisis period, it is essential to have a 
broader look into fiscal cyclicality as fiscal volatility could be caused by financial cycles 
even with small output gaps. 
Fiscal cyclicality study centres on how fiscal variables move with output cycle. Simply 
defined, fiscal cyclicality is the direction towards which the fiscal variables (revenues and 
expenditures) move with output cycle. Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) are the early 
advocate of the approach through which the cyclicality of fiscal policy could be 
determined by investigating the direction of co-movements between the instruments of 
fiscal policy and economic output cycles. In their study, they proposed three forms of 
fiscal cyclicality a government could undertake: (i)pro-cyclicality – which is when the 
fiscal policy instruments move with the business cycle as government would reduce 
(raise) revenues and increase  (lower) expenditures in good (bad) times;1counter-
cyclicality – which when the fiscal policy instruments move against the business cycle as 
government raises (lowers) revenue/tax rate and lowers (raises) expenditure in good 
(bad) times: acyclicality – which is when government revenues and expenditures are 
constant over the economic cycles and this will neither reinforce nor stabilise the 
business cycle (Mpatswe, Tapsoba and York, 2011). Furthermore, Benetrix and Lane 
(2012) pointed out that “a constant government budget balance/GDP ratio over the cycle 
may be regarded as acyclical in a descriptive sense, but it is pro-cyclical in terms of the 
underlying dynamics with revenue gains upswing used to finance spending increases or tax cuts and revenue declines downturn inducing spending cuts or tax hike”.   
Fiscal policy would be effective if it is able to smooth the volatility of output during 
business cycles. During the booms, fiscal policy should contract while it should expand 
during recessions, thus portraying its counter-cyclicality. In the theoretical sense, three 
economic schools of thought (Neo-classical, the Keynesian and the New Growth theorists) 
are proponents of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. However, empirical studies reveal that 
many countries run pro-cyclical fiscal policy. The consensus point to the resolution that 
                                                          
1Simply put, there would be expansionary fiscal policy during economic booms and contractionary policy during 
recession. 
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the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy should only be required when market needs to be 
stabilised and the sustainability of fiscal policy is necessary. 
Borrowing largely from Hathroubi and Rezgui (2011), we can express some of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the cyclical nature of fiscal policy which are in line with the 
analytical frameworks of Neo-classical and Keynesian economists. Evaluating the government’s fiscal response during the bad times (or sharp cycle contractions), the 
position of the Keynesian economists is that this stems from an expansionary budget 
deficit either through a tax cut that increases the current revenue or increase in public expenditure that stimulates demand. It could be deduced here that the fiscal policy’s 
counter-cyclicality orientation is optimal. On the other hand, neo-classical economists’ 
position is that debt is counter-cyclical to revenue, and that the optimal fiscal policy involves ‘tax rate smoothing’ so as to reduce ‘tax excess burden’ or the ‘well-being cost of tax’,2 allow the generation of necessary financial resources to cover government’s 
spending needs and also avoid the conflict between government (that raises taxes 
revenue to finance its expenditure) and consumers (that pay taxes). Consequently, if the 
level of activity/revenue (without government discretionary intervention through tax 
rate) is the only determinant of tax revenues, the budget deficits and public debt should 
therefore widen during the bad times and shrink during the good times, thus causing the 
level of government expenditure to affect the level of debt.3 Another view point of the neoclassical economists is that fiscal policy cyclicality could also be determined by ‘the 
degree of substitution between public consumption and private demand for consumption and investment’.4 From these explanations, fiscal policy cyclicality cannot be interpreted 
in isolation of the expansionary or contractionary effect of the fiscal policy. Consequently, 
the optimality of counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy also implies the optimality of 
budgetary stimulus that stabilises the economy. Within the perspective of the Keynesian 
and neo-classical economics, public expenditure increase would stimulate economy 
during recession while it would be dangerous to allow fiscal  cyclicality during recession 
                                                          
2Tax smoothing is optimal since it satisfies the government interpemporal budget contraints. 
3Hathroubi and Rezgui (2011) citing Barro (1974, 1979). 
4Hathroubi and Rezgui (2011) citing Aschauer, 1989) 
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since a reduction in public expenditure will result into an amplified negative consequence 
on the economic output.5 
Studies reveal that in many developing countries, particularly in African countries, fiscal 
policies have been pro-cyclical, contracting during bad times and expanding during good 
times (Thornton (2008); Lledo, Yackvoc and Gadene (2011)). Dessus, Sanchez and 
Varoundakus (2013) who got evidence of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in WAEMU cite 
Aizenman et al (2000) and Gavin and Perotti (1977) as concluding that often, fiscal policy 
pro-cyclicality is explained by the loss of access to international capital market during 
recession (bad times) and which in the absence of fiscal space through accumulated 
savings make expansionary policies to be expensive (if not impossible) during bad times. 
It could be established by literature that the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies are more 
pronounced in African countries than in more advanced countries due to: (a) lack of 
adequate automatic stabilisers; (b) difficulty in knowing the stage of the cycle, lags in 
fiscal policies; (c) little access to financing (domestic and external) during recessions; (iv) 
the tendency to increase government spending during expansion, thus leading to 
unsatisfied social demands. These are the reasons why pro-cyclicality is prevalent in the 
developing African context. Investigating if fiscal policy in Africa is able to contribute 
towards stabilising output growth volatility in Africa, Carmignani(2010) got evidence to 
established that though fiscal policy in Africa has prevalently Keynesian effect at both 
normal and abnormal times and that African countries tend to adopt pro-cyclical or 
acyclical fiscal policy stance as against the economic growth stabilising countercyclical 
fiscal policy.6 
While stressing the significance of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, Strawczynski and Zeira 
(2007) posit that the importance of fiscal policy cyclicality stems from the view that it 
brings to the fore and to a large extent, the constraints faced by the government in 
forming its policies; and in support of the view in extant literature, they highlight that 
country with pro-cyclical fiscal policy are usually run by governments that face severe 
credit constraints. 
                                                          
5In support of this position, Ilzetski and Vegh (2008) are able to establish the conditions for the optimality of fiscal 
policy counter-cyclicality. 
6The approach employed by Carmignani (2010) builds on the simple theoretical view that ‘if fiscal policy has 
Keynesian effect, then it must be run counter-cyclically to establish output growth’ 
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3. Models of  Fiscal Cyclicality  
In a fiscal behaviour literature review by Golinelli and Momigliano (2007)7 there are 
three basic specifications of fiscal behaviour in past studies. These are models in 
which:(i)changes in cyclically adjusted fiscal balance is explained by cyclically adjusted 
initial primary balance, debt and output gap; (ii) policymakers react to lag of primary 
balance (rather than cyclically adjusted initial primary balance);(iii)changes in primary 
balance is explained by lagged values of  primary balance, debt and output gap. They 
however added that none of the three specifications could do justice to the richness of the 
studies reviewed. Following Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) in line with some core fiscal rules, 
seven models of fiscal cyclicality that guide the empirical estimation of fiscal policy 
cyclical behaviour are specified below: 
Model 1: Contemporaneous Fiscal Rule: This is a model of the contemporaneous fiscal rule 
exhibiting the models of reverse causality as: 
gt = α + τyt + εt                                                                                    (1) 
yt = α + δgt+ μt                                                         (2) 
Where: gt is the cyclical component of government expenditure at time t; yt is the cyclical 
component of output at time t; α is the constant; εt is the residual representing an 
independently and identically distributed shock (fiscal shock) with mean 0 and variance σε2, μt is the residual representing an independently and identically distributed shock (supply shock) with mean 0 and variance σμ2.  
It is important not to neglect the possibility of endogeneity problem which reveal highly 
misleading result. Therefore, solving for the reduced form of equation (1) and equation 
(2) we have: 
 
yt   =   δεt + μt /1 – δτ                                                   (3) 
  gt   =   τμt  + εt /1 – δτ                                                   (4) 
                                                          
7 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004288 or  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2004288 
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Thus revealing the covariance between yt  and gt  as: 
COV(yt ,gt) = 1/(1 – δτ)2.( δ σε2 + τσμ2)                             (5) 
On the assumption of the absence of output shock, (σμ2 = 0), we generate: 
COV(yt ,gt)| σμ2 = 0 δσε2/(1 – δτ)2 >0                                    (6) 
Because the covariance between yt and gt is not zero, it would be inappropriate to 
estimate equation (1) by OLS. The way out is to estimate equation (1) by introduction 
instrumental variables in a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation method. Lagged 
GDP growth would be applied as instrumental variable.  
Model 2: Lagged Fiscal Rule: With this model, attempts are being made to test how 
statistically significant is the fiscal cyclical reactions to output and to further reveal if 
government expenditures has expansionary effect on output in these countries.  If we 
assume that government expenditure does not respond to contemporaneous output, but 
lagged output; and that government expenditure and lagged output determines output, 
we have: 
gt = α + ψyt-1 + εt                                                                                     (7) 
yt = α + ξyt-1 + λgt + μt                                                    (8) 
Where: gt is the cyclical component of government expenditure at time t; yt-1 is one period 
lagged the cyclical component of output at time t; α is the constant; ψ is parameter of 
estimated cyclicality coefficient; and εt is the residual representing an independently and 
identically distributed shock (fiscal shock) with mean 0 and variance σε2, μt is the residual 
representing an independently and identically distributed shock (supply shock) with mean 0 and variance σμ2. If we substitute equation (7) into equation (8), we derive: 
yt = α+(ξ + ψλ) yt-1+θt                                                                               (9) 
Where: θt = σεt + σμt 
Assuming that (ξ + ψλ) < 1, equation 9 can be expressed as: 
yt  = ∑(ξ + ψλ)j  θt-j                                                                               (10) 
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Consequently:  
E(yt)= 0 
Var(yt)= σθ2/1-(ξ + ψλ)2 
With the assumption that the objective of the policymaker is to minimize output 
variability for given values of ξ and λ, then, by implications, 1-(ξ + ψλ)2 is maximized, 
hence the solution: 
ψopt = -(ξ/λ) 
The output variance is reduced to if this optimum is implemented, thus rendering an 
acyclical and procyclical policy to be apparently suboptimal. However, a countercyclical 
fiscal policy would cause an increase in government expenditure (g) to partly offset the 
decline in output (y).  We can therefore estimate equation (7) and equation (8) by OLS 
because: 
E (εt yt-1) = 0 
E (μt yt-1) = 0 
E (μt gt) = 0 
Model 3 and Model 4 – Time trend and non-cyclically adjusted fiscal variables: This is about 
the introduction into the fiscal behaviour model, time trend and lagged dependent 
variable of first difference of log of government expenditure (not cyclically adjusted).  
    ∆lngt = α + β1∆lnyt + ζ1lngt-1 + γ1Tt + εt                                                           (11) 
    ∆lngt = α + β2∆lnyt + ζ2lngt-1 + τlnyt-1 + γ2Tt + εt                                              (12) 
Where: ∆lngt is the first difference log of government expenditure at time t; ∆lnyt is the 
first difference log of real GDP at time t; Tt  is time trend; β1, β2 are parameters of estimated 
cyclicality coefficient; and εt is error terms (representing fiscal shocks). 
Model 5: Rule allowing automatic stabiliser to function fully: This model is in initial public 
finances explain the discretionary fiscal policy action. The model is consistent with a fiscal 
rule in which automatic stabiliser is expected to operate fully and effectively, Golinelli 
and Momigliano (2009): 
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∆lnpb*t = α + β3lnpb*t-1 + ζ3gpt-1 + γ3Dt or t-1 + εt                                                  (13) 
Where: ∆lnpb* is the first difference of cyclically adjusted primary balance; lnpb is 
primary balance; gp is output gap;8 Dt is public debt; β3 is parameters of estimated 
cyclicality coefficient; and εt is error terms (representing fiscal shocks). 
Model 6: Discretionary fiscal action and the initial public finance: Because 
policymakers are more interested in headline figure, some researchers consider this 
model to be more realistic. This reason is in addition to the lack of cyclically adjusted 
fiscal data three or four decades ago when cyclical adjustments of fiscal variables were 
not common.9   
∆pb*t = α + β4pbt-1 + ζ4gpt-1 + γ4Dt or t-1 + εt                                                      (14) 
Where: ∆pb* is the first difference of cyclically adjusted primary balance; pb is primary 
balance; gp is output gap (either at the year in which budgetary action; Dt  is public debt; 
β4, ζ4, γ4 are parameters of estimated cyclicality coefficient; and εt is error terms 
(representing fiscal shocks). 
Model 7: Fiscal policy decision incorporating discretionary actions and automatic 
stabiliser: This model is expressed as: 
∆pbt = α + β5pbt-1 + ζ5gpt-1 + γ5Dt or t-1 + εt                                                 (15) 
Where: ∆pb is the first difference primary balance; pb is primary balance; gp is output 
gap; Dt  is public debt; β5 is parameters of estimated cyclicality coefficient; εt is error term 
(representing fiscal shocks). 
4. Data and Methods 
In this study, the models of fiscal policy cyclical behaviour of the Anglophone West 
African countries and Guinea were specified at the level and backward-looking in line 
with the contemporaneous fiscal rule model and lagged fiscal rule model expressed 
above. These equations were estimated using annual data of the relative fiscal variables 
of the WAMZ countries spanning generally over the 15-year period between 2000 and 
                                                          
8 For output gap, many past studies opt for time (t) output gap (indicating the year in which budgetary actions are 
effective while many apply time (t-1) which is the year when budgetary decision was taken.      
9 Golinelli and Momigliano (2009). 
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2014. There have been arguments that the estimation of the response of government 
expenditure (as fiscal instrument) to output is better to be annual rather than quarterly. 
This was a strong reason for the use of annual fiscal data and the real GDP data serving 
as proxy for output, coupled with the non-availability of quarterly fiscal data for these 
West African countries. The six WAMZ countries under assessment here are commodity 
exporting countries and the commodity windfalls uniformly influence government 
expenditure patterns in these countries. This makes the panel data regression 
estimations employed in this study to be appropriate.  
The model of contemporaneous fiscal rule implies the instant reaction of the cyclical 
component of government spending to the cyclical component of real output (real GDP).10 
Therefore, Equation (1) estimates the response of government expenditure to 
contemporaneous output, thereby capturing a fiscal reaction function in which the coefficient τ represents fiscal policy cyclical stance. Therefore, fiscal policy in a WAMZ country would be countercyclical if τ < 0, procyclical if τ >0, and acyclical if τ =0. On the 
other hand, the model of lagged fiscal rule, while attempting to test how statistically 
significant is the fiscal cyclical reactions to output in the West African countries under 
study, further reveals if government expenditures has expansionary effect on output in 
these countries from a backward looking perspective, with the assumption that 
government expenditure does not respond to contemporaneous output.  For the 
assessment of fiscal cyclicality in the Anglophone West Africa and Guinea, the panel data 
estimation were performed with the application of Equation (1) and Equation (7) for the 
contemporaneous and lagged fiscal rules respectively. Panel data random effects 
generalised least square (RE-GLS) regression, random effects maximum likelihood 
estimation (RE-MLE) regression, generalised estimating equation (GEE) population-
averaged regression and fixed effects regressions were performed to generate results. 
To gather further evidence of fiscal cyclicality in the WAMZ countries, further steps are 
taken to incorporate some explanatory control variables (like first difference log of 
output and time trend) into the fiscal cyclicality analysis. The dependent variable 
(government expenditure) is also in first difference.  
 
                                                          
10 Mpatswe et al (2011) point out that this is the Taylor-type reaction function without inflation terms. 
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5. Findings and Results  
The unbalanced panel data estimation results of the random effects GLS, random effects 
MLE, population-averaged and fixed effects regressions are exhibited in Table 1 below in 
which all coefficients of real output are statistically significant at the 5% for the 
contemporaneous fiscal rule estimations, suggesting counter-cyclicality across the four 
methods of regression. 
Table 1 
Results of Unbalanced Panel Data Estimations of Fiscal Cyclicality  
Models of Contemporaneous and Lagged Fiscal Rules  
Estimation Method Contemporaneous 
Coefficient 
Lagged 
Coefficient 
Random Effects GLS Regression -0.7206* 
(0.1821) 
Wald Stat:15.65 
Prob: (0.00) 
-0.1892 
(0.1689) 
Wald Stat:1.25 
Prob: (0.26) 
Random Effects MLE Regression -0.6092* 
(0.1256) 
LR Stat:21.79 
Prob: (0.00) 
-0.1838 
(0.1343) 
Wald Stat:1.86 
Prob: (0.17) 
Fixed Effect Regression -0.6049* 
(0.1260) 
F Stat:23.06 
Prob: (0.00) 
-0.1834 
(0.1348) 
F Stat:1.85 
Prob: (0.18) 
GEE Population Averaged Regression -0.6194* 
(0.1508) 
LR Stat:16.86 
Prob: (0.00) 
-0.1849 
(0.1655) 
LR Stat:1.26 
Prob: (0.26) 
          Source: Author’s Estimation and Stata 14 Output. 
Note: Standard error coefficients are in parenthesis.  
* represents 5% levels of significance. 
 
There are joint significance as evident by the Wald-statistics, F-statistics and LR-statistics. 
The lagged fiscal rule regression estimates exhibits statistically insignificant of the 
coefficients of interest as well as the statistical joint insignificance of panel regression 
methods as revealed by the Wald-statistics, F-statistics and LR-statistics indicating that 
there are no statistical significant information about co-movements of fiscal policy and 
real output cycle variables in the WAMZ. It should be noted that the backward looking 
perspective evaluation is with the assumption that government expenditure does not 
respond to contemporaneous output.   
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6. Conclusions 
Within the context of the achievement of fiscal cyclicality objectives, this research study 
assessed the nature of fiscal cyclicality within the Anglophone West African countries as 
well as Guinea (all known as the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) countries) over 
the 15-year period covered by the study, as a pointer to the future. Panel data random 
effects generalised least square (RE-GLS) regression, random effects maximum likelihood 
estimation (RE-MLE) regression, generalised estimating equation (GEE) population-
averaged regression and fixed effects regressions were performed to generate results 
which prompted the suggestion of significant counter-cyclicality across the Anglophone 
West African countries and Guinea (the WAMZ).  The statistically significant results of the 
estimations of the contemporaneous fiscal rule estimations suggested counter-cyclicality 
across the four methods of regression. The panel data estimations produced evidence to 
suggest that government expenditure responds to contemporaneous output, but not 
lagged output in these WAMZ in which counter-cyclicality was equally established.  What 
these denote for the future West African monetary union is that fiscal policies moves 
against business cycles in the Anglophone countries and Guinea evaluated in this study. In ‘bust’ or financial and economic crisis, fiscal authorities in these countries are likely to 
opt for expansionary fiscal policies (lowering revenue/taxes and raising expenditures) while they are likely to contract fiscal policy during ‘boom’. These would have effects on 
the monetary integration of the West Africa, if on the take-off of the West African 
monetary union, fiscal policy matters are eventually relinquished to national authorities, 
with implications for fiscal policy/monetary policy interactions as reflected in fiscal 
policy and/or monetary policy regimes dominance stances across countries within the 
proposed West African monetary union when monetary policy would be in the hand of a 
supranational regional monetary authority while the fiscal policies would be in the hands 
of up to fifteen national authorities. 
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